



THE NEGLECTED SUPPLY SIDE1
1. Introduction
Since the publication of the Stern Review (2006), the
problem of global warming has been put high on the
political agenda. Tony Blair stressed the need for
urgent action, it was the main theme during Ger-
many’s EU presidency in the first half of 2007, and
the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm in June 2007
focused on it. The Bali conference in 2007 called for
rapid action. 
Indeed, the scientific evidence for an increase in the
carbon dioxide (CO2) content and a subsequent
warming of the atmosphere is overwhelming. The
facts are undeniable.
• From measuring the CO2 content of air bubbles in
ice cones drilled in Greenland and Antarctica one
knows that it was 280 ppm (parts per million) be-
fore industrialisation, whereas now it is 380 ppm. 
• Although 380 ppm is tiny, implying that less than
0.04 percent of the air is CO2, the impact on aver-
age world temperature is enormous. If carbon
dioxide and other, less important, greenhouse
gases2 were absent from the atmosphere, average
temperature of the earth’s surface would be – 6 C.
With the greenhouse gases, the present average
temperature is 15 C, about 21 C more than with-
out them. Obviously, the temperature is extremely
sensitive to even small variations in greenhouse gas
concentration. 
• Since pre-industrial times, average world tempera-
ture has increased by 0.8 C. The acceleration in
recent decades has induced a rapid melting of
Greenland ice and of glaciers. The northern polar
cap has shrunk sufficiently to raise expectations
that the Northwest Passage between the Atlantic
and the Pacific will soon be navigable. The sea
level has risen by 20 cm relative to pre-industrial
times.
There is broad agreement among climate forecasters
that with a business-as-usual scenario the temperature
increase will be in the order of 3 C between 2035 and
2050 relative to pre-industrial times. The Stern Review
fears a 5 C increase in a business-as-usual scenario by
2100. The authors of the review argue that 5 C is a
threshold at which mankind will be entering “un-
known territory”. As a comparison, a 5 C increase is
equivalent to the temperature increase since the last
ice age, some 15,000 years ago. The costs in terms of
floods, storms and countervailing investment in heat-
protected dwellings and air-conditioning will be huge
by all standards, whatever the assumptions of the
forecasts are in detail. Migration waves from arid to
fertile parts of the world could even threaten the polit-
ical stability of the world. Thus, there is broad politi-
cal agreement that policy measures against global
warming are needed. 
2. The current policies 
A major policy move was the so-called Kyoto
Protocol of 1997. The Protocol stipulates that the
contracting parties (most of them industrialised coun-
tries) reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases in
the commitment period 2008–2012 by 5.2 percent
compared to the level of 1990. 
The Protocol has been signed by 175 countries to date,
but for most of the countries signing implied no costs,
as emissions were not effectively constrained. Of the
175 countries, only 51 countries are required to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions below levels specified for
each of them in the treaty. The rules of the treaty
effectively constrain only 29 percent of current world-
wide emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2).
Important countries like China and India signed, but
are not constrained, and the US did not even ratify
the contract. Australia, one of the largest polluters in
per capita terms, initially did not ratify the contract
1 This chapter closely follows the von Thünen Lecture given by
Hans-Werner Sinn to the German Verein für Socialpolitik, October
2007, and is based on the theoretical foundations laid in his presi-
dential address to the International Institute of Public Finance in
August 2007. See Sinn (2007a, 2007b, 2007c).
2 In particular, 0.02 percent water vapour, 1.8 ppm methane and
0.3 ppm nitrous oxide.either but has recently signed documents to ratify it in
Bali. The EU15 countries are among those effective-
ly constrained by the Kyoto Protocol. They commit-
ted to reducing their CO2 output by 8 percent by
2008–2012. They mutually agreed on an allocation
plan distributing the required CO2 reductions inter-
nally. Some countries have advanced substantially in
fulfilling these requirements, others lag behind. In
2005, Germany, for example, had already accom-
plished nine tenths of its reduction target of 21 per-
cent. Some of the Western European countries like
France, Finland, Sweden and the UK are good per-
formers too, whereas other countries are still amiss in
living up to their commitments. Spain was allowed to
increase its emissions by 15 percent but in fact had
increased them by 52 percent by 2005; Ireland
increased its emissions by 25 percent, although it was
allowed to increase them only by 13 percent. In
Portugal the actual increase is 40 percent, while the
country’s limit was set at 27 percent. Italy is obliged
to cut its emissions by 6.5 percent but increased them
by 12.5 percent instead. Austria promised to reduce
its emissions by 13 percent but actually increased
them by 18 percent.3 To be sure, by the end of 2005,
the non-complying countries still had up to seven fur-
ther years to meet their targets. However, as two
thirds of the adjustment period had already passed
by then, it seems unlikely that the violators will still
be able to comply. Hence, it must be feared that the
treaty is not even working for the countries that
signed and ratified it. 
The bad performance is surprising insofar as there is
a Compliance Committee that supervises the coun-
tries’ efforts and that may even impose sanctions. It
may require a non-complying country to reduce its
emissions by a further 30 percent of its target devia-
tion and it can suspend this country from making
transfers under an emissions trading program.
Hopefully, the new emissions trading system intro-
duced by the EU in 2005 will make a difference. The
European Emissions Trading System covers energy
producers and energy-intensive industries of the man-
ufacturing sector such as the production and process-
ing of ferrous metals or the mineral oil industry, in
total about 45 percent of the EU’s CO2 emissions and
about 30 percent of the EU’s overall greenhouse gas
emissions (European Commission 2005). Emissions
from other sectors, private households and traffic are
not included in the trading system, although they are
noted in the Kyoto Protocol. At this stage it is difficult
to evaluate the performance of the system, as there
are no reliable data on the emissions before the intro-
duction of the system. However, according to a state-
ment by EU Commissioner Dimas, it can be assumed
that CO2 emissions decreased by a few percent in the
first year of the new system.4
The EU system involves two trading periods. The first
was from 2005 to 2007, the second is from 2008 to
2012. At the beginning of the second trading period
the reduction targets for energy producers and energy-
intensive industries will be tightened, and perhaps the
EU will then be able to come closer to its target than
now seems likely. In 2011, the European Commission
plans to include air traffic in the emissions trading
system. 
Other EU measures to reduce CO2 emissions include
targets for renewable energy sources, research and
development programmes and guidelines for taxing
energy as well as sector-specific measures to be
implemented by the member countries. EU guide-
lines were to induce member countries to levy taxes
on energy consumption or introduce feed-in tariffs
for alternative energy producers and quotas for
renewable energy sources. The EU has set a binding
target to have 20 percent of the EU's overall energy
consumption coming from renewable energy sources
by 2020. In 2005 this share amounted to 6.3 percent
in the EU and to 4.7 percent in Germany. Some EU
countries like Austria, Portugal and the Scan-
dinavian countries have reached shares of more than
15 percent because of their large supplies of hydro-
power. In the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Bel-
gium renewable energy sources have a share of less
than 3 percent. 
In addition, the EU countries are carrying out a num-
ber of voluntary measures that are designed to reduce
CO2 emissions or unintentionally have this implica-
tion. In 2005, France was generating 78 percent of its
electricity from nuclear power, while the average of
the EU25 countries is 31 percent. Other countries
with a relatively high share of nuclear power in elec-
tricity generation are Lithuania at 72 percent, Bel-
gium at 56 percent, Sweden at 47 percent, Germany at
26 percent and the UK at 20 percent.
In general, the measures implemented in the EU
countries may be classified as in Table 5.1. 
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As most of these measures are discussed in great
detail in the media, we forego repeating a discussion
of their technical and economic effectiveness here.
Two remarks are appropriate, however.
First, the policy measures do not include sequestra-
tion and afforestation. We will argue below that these
are two particularly effective measures that deserve
more attention than they have received thus far.
Second, all measures listed in Table 5.1 are similar in
the sense that they want to solve the CO2 problem by
reducing the demand for fossil fuels. Better insulation,
lighter cars and a reduction of traffic diminish
demand directly. Producing electricity from wind,
water, biomass or sunlight means using a replacement
technology to produce energy which also reduces the
demand for fossil fuels. The hybrid car belongs to this
category because it transforms brake energy into elec-
tricity. Nuclear energy from splitting atoms is the
most important replacement technology in use today,
and perhaps one day nuclear fusion reactors will be
available. Nuclear energy can be transported via the
grids, but it could also be used in vehicles if the elec-
tricity is converted to hydrogen, which is a storage
device rather than an energy source of its own. Green,
non-energy sources like pellet heating, bio diesel, heat
pumps, solar heating and geothermal heat are already
frequently used in Europe due to high subsidies paid. 
Finally, there are ways to improve the efficiency of
combustion processes by avoiding the waste of
unburned fuels such as power stations with finer coal
powder and common rail diesel engines. They also
reduce the demand for fossil fuels. 
The measures taken to reduce the demand for fossil
fuels and the emissions of carbon dioxide stand in
striking contrast to the development of actual emis-
sion figures. As Figure 5.1 shows, worldwide emis-
sions of carbon dioxide have continued to grow even
after the Kyoto protocol was signed. There is not even
a dent in the curve. If anything, emissions have accel-
erated in recent years. This poses a puzzle for eco-
nomic theory and raises doubts about the efficacy of
the demand-policies taken thus far. The subsequent
sections will explain how we believe the puzzle can be
solved and what type of policy conclusions follow. 
3. The missing supply side
The rationale behind the demand policies is that they
contribute to providing a global public good. If only
a few “green” countries reduced their CO2 exhaust,
there would be less CO2 in the air, the temperature of
the atmosphere would remain lower, and some of the
costs of global warming could be avoided. All coun-
tries would benefit from the
actions of the green countries. To
be sure, it would be better if all
countries reduced their demand,
but even if only a few countries
do, global warming is at least
mitigated somewhat.
Unfortunately, this rationale is
incomplete to say the least,
because it neglects crucial links
between the green countries and
other countries via the underly-
ing energy markets. The amount
of CO2  emitted into the air
depends on the carbon consump-
tion of the green countries, on
the carbon consumption of non-
Table 5.1
Figure 5.1green countries and on the supply of the extracting
countries. Only if world wide supply is very price-elas-
tic, such that suppliers are willing to follow demand at
minimal price changes, is the assumption correct that
demand changes of green countries translate directly
into changes in CO2 emissions. If supply is not very
price-elastic, things are different. 
Suppose, to illustrate the problem, that world supply
of fossil fuels does not react to price changes. In that
case, the green countries’ demand restraint is useless.
The restraint will depress the world market price of
carbon sufficiently to induce other consumer coun-
tries to consume so much more carbon that the over-
all output of CO2 remains unchanged. If this case pre-
vailed, the demand restraint of the EU countries
would simply subsidise Americans to enable them to
drive even bigger SUVs and the Chinese to finance a
further acceleration of their CO2-intensive growth
process. The contribution to slowing down the pace of
global warming would be nil. Figure 5.2 illustrates
this case. 
The distance between the two vertical lines marks the
world flow supply of carbon in a particular year t.
Assume for the sake of argument that it does not react
to price changes. This assumption will be removed
further below. From left to right, the diagram mea-
sures the demand of the green countries and from
right to left the demand of the other countries. The
demand reduction by the green countries depresses
the world price of carbon from P* to P** and reallo-
cates the given supply from the green countries to
other countries as is shown by the arrow below the
diagram.
When carbon supply is price-inelastic, there are other
implications for environmental policy that are worth
noting:
• The use of alternative energy sources, such as elec-
tricity from wind, water, sunlight or nuclear power,
does not mitigate global warming but simply
increases world energy consumption. 
• The production of bio diesel, ethanol or wood pel-
lets will likewise increase energy consumption. In
addition, it will exacerbate the problem of global
warming to the extent that it implies the conver-
sion of forests so that the average stock of cut
wood in buildings or living wood in trees is
reduced. (Note that wood, in whatever form, is a
store of carbon as long as the wood is not degrad-
ing.) If the production of bio fuel does not imply
the conversion of forest land but the conversion of
land used for food production, it will increase food
prices. The net effect on carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere will be zero in this case. Likewise the
net effect will be zero if bio-energy is produced
from material that otherwise would be wasted,
degrading by oxidation.5
• Improvements in combustion processes that do not
involve the reduction of the waste of heat but oper-
ate via a more complete combustion of fossil fuels,
such as using finer coal powder for power stations
or the common rail diesel technology, will increase
CO2  output and increase global warming. (Im-
provements reducing the waste of heat such as
those resulting from a better motor management
are CO2 neutral in the aggregate.) 
Although all of this is only a thought experiment, it
demonstrates how futile it is to
carry out demand policies with-
out knowing how they affect
supply. To predict the effects on
global warming, it is essential to
understand the supply side of
the world energy market. Only
to the extent that demand poli-
cies succeed in inducing the
owners of carbon to keep their
stocks underground will they be




5 If degrading occurs without oxidation
such that methane is produced and evapo-
rates to the atmosphere, the production of
bio fuel can slow down global warming as
methane is six times as dangerous a green-
house gas as carbon dioxide over a period
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over a period of 100 years. See IPCC
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global warming. This trivial fact has often been
overlooked in the public and scientific debates of
the problem. 
4. The supply potential
To understand supply, it is useful to first focus on the
available and exploitable stocks of reduced carbon in
the ground, for these stocks are the source of the CO2
problem. Reduced carbon that can be used for com-
bustion (oxidation) is contained in coal, oil and
methane. Combustion combines the carbon with oxy-
gen to produce CO2. Burning one tonne of carbon
generates 3.6 tonnes of CO2. Carbon occurs normally
in conjunction with other elements, in particular
hydrogen as so-called hydrocarbons. Hydrogen can
also be burned and contributes to the energy content
of fossil fuels. As hydrogen turns to water upon com-
bustion, it is harmless for the environment. The larger
the hydrogen content of the fuel, the lower is the CO2
output per unit of energy produced. Methane, in par-
ticular, is advantageous in this regard. For each car-
bon atom it has four hydrogen atoms, each of which
produces about 30 percent of the energy of the carbon
atom. Thus, with methane, the CO2 output per unit of
energy is less than half of that of coal which predom-
inantly consists of carbon.
Whatever the fossil fuel is, the amount of CO2 pro-
duced upon combustion is strictly proportional to
the amount of carbon burned. In fact, combustion
just means transporting the carbon from below
ground to above ground where it enters the atmos-
phere. About 55 percent of the CO2 entering the
atmosphere is quickly absorbed by the oceans and
the biomass, because it enters near the earth’s sur-
face. Unlike other greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide
spreading into higher layers of the atmosphere dis-
appears only very slowly with the passage of time.
45 percent of the emissions stay in the atmosphere
after about 100 years, and another 20 percentage
points disappear in the next 200 years. The remain-
ing 25 percent build a very robust stock that will
practically never disappear. The IPCC (2007) argues
that it takes many thousands of years for the anthro-
pogenic (caused by man) CO2 to disappear from the
air, so that emissions are extremely persistent.
Archer (2005) as well as Archer and Brovkin (2006)
find that the mean lifetime of CO2 from fossil fuel
combustion in the atmosphere is about 30–35 thou-
sand years. 
The Stern Review has provided a summary estimate
of past, present and future CO2 concentrations in
parts per million (ppm) and the corresponding
implications for the temperature of the atmosphere.
The estimates considered most plausible by the
authors of the report are listed in Table 5.2, togeth-
er with information on the corresponding absolute
Table 5.2 









Pre-industrial 600  280  14 
Today 800  380  15 
2035 
(Stern estimate) 
1,200 560 17 
(15.5–18.4)
All reserves burned:  850 GtC 
(estimated range 766-983) 1,183 555 17 
(15.5–18.4)
2100 
(Stern estimate)  1,900 900 19 
(16.2–22.3)
All resources  burned:  4773 GtC 
(estimated. range 3967-5579 GtC)
2,948 1,384  ?
All resources burned:  4773 GtC 
(estimated range: 3967-5579 GtC) 1,993 936  19.5 
 (16.8–22.3)
Note: Estimates about reserves and resources are taken from the World Resource Institute (2006), the 
World Energy Council (2000, p. 149) and EIA (2007). With regard to the estimates from BP (2007 
pp. 6, 22, 32) as well as BGR (2005, p. 6 n.) we calculated the respective carbon contents. The short
term is defined as the next 100 years, the time beyond 2300 we call the long term. According to the 
recent literature 45 percent of anthropogenic CO2 emissions stays in the atmosphere after 100 years.
After 300 years only 25 percent of emissions remain in the atmosphere forever. These estimates about
the lifetime of anthropogenic CO2 are taken from Archer (2005), Archer and Brovkin (2006) and Hoos
et al. (2001). Temperature projections are according to the 5–95 percent climate sensitivity ranges 



































)stock of carbon (without the oxygen content 
of CO2).6
The translation of the Stern results into absolute car-
bon quantities makes it possible to reconcile the fore-
casts with estimates of the world’s reserves and
resource. Reserves are those stocks that are known
and worth exploiting at current prices. Resources
also include stocks that are not well known and/or
will become profitable only at substantially higher
prices.
Estimates of reserves and resources are given by the
World Resource Institute, the World Energy Council,
the Energy Information Administration of the US
Government, British Petroleum and the German
Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources
(BGR). The carbon content of the respective pub-
lished figures can easily be calculated (the carbon con-
tent itself, not the energy equivalent carbon contents).
Accordingly, the values for carbon reserves range
from 766 GtC (British Petroleum) to 983 GtC (World
Energy Council). The values for resources range from
3967 Gt of carbon (BGR) to 5579 Gt of carbon
(World Energy Council). In its second column,
Table 5.2 lists these ranges as well as the average val-
ues of the sources screened. 
Obviously, the average reserve estimate of 850 GtC
yields a carbon content in the air that is about twice
as much as in pre-industrial times and comes close to
the Stern estimate for 2035, according to which the
temperature will rise by 3 C, relative to pre-industrial
times, from 14 C to 17 C. The scenario that the Stern
report associates with the year 2100 and that would
result in a temperature increase by 5 C to a level of
19 C, is associated with a carbon exhaustion of
1900 Gt. This is more than burning all reserves but
much less than burning all resources. 
The more interesting question is what happens when
all resources are used up. The last two rows of the dia-
gram refer to this case. If reserves were burned very
quickly, say up to 2100, this would imply more than a
quadrupling of the pre-industrial carbon content of
the air. This would clearly be a catastrophic scenario
where the temperature would rise way beyond 19 C
where, in the words of the Stern Review, humans enter
“unknown territory”. We know of no forecasts that
would dare make predictions about this case, and for-
tunately it seems very unlikely that resources could be
burned over such a short period of time. 
Over the very long run, say 300 years from now, where
only 25 percent of the emissions stay in the air, the
implications of burning all resources might be more
manageable, as the temperature would then only
increase to 19.5 C, as in the Stern scenario, up to
2100. Thus it would be essential for mankind to
extract the carbon dioxide slowly enough to give
nature a chance to absorb most of it and avoid cata-
strophic concentrations. Even then, however, the tem-
perature would be high enough to cause permanent
damage to the earth, as Stern et al. have convincingly
demonstrated in their voluminous and carefully pre-
pared report. 
Nature has endowed mankind with a supply of
reduced, oxidizable carbon in the ground. Economic
decisions of resource owners transform the natural
supply into a market supply, supply finds its demand
via the price mechanism, and by the laws of chemistry
the extracted carbon becomes CO2 output. Obviously,
therefore, the economics of global warming cannot be
understood without understanding how the markets
for fossil fuels work. The next section will go into this
question. 
5. The determinants of carbon supply: the ideal case
Supply reactions in the carbon markets are funda-
mentally different from supply reactions in normal
markets for the simple reason that the stock of carbon
in the ground is depletable and cannot be reproduced.
The supply of nature is indeed as constant as was sup-
posed in the thought experiment made above. How-
ever, there are two economic decisions by the resource
owning firms that transform the supply of nature into
a market supply. The firms have to decide (i) which
parts of the given stock to extract in the long run and
(ii) how to distribute this extraction over time. As a
result of these decisions they implicitly also choose
the current flow supply that determines the current
CO2 output and hence the current pace of global
warming. 
The first of these decisions depends on how the price
of the extracted resource behaves relative to the unit
extraction cost as the stock underground and with it
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the current flow of extraction becomes smaller and
smaller. If the resource is an essential, it is plausible
to assume that the price will increase beyond all
bounds as the extraction flow dwindles to zero. Thus
a bit of extraction will always be profitable as long as
some of the stock is left over, and no part of the
stock of resources will be permanently exempt from
extraction. 
To be sure, the higher prices are, the larger are the
endogenous incentives to avoid the combustion of
fossil fuels by using other energy sources from solar to
nuclear power and to avoid the waste of energy by a
better insulation of homes or the use of hybrid
engines and sophisticated common rail diesel engines.
The spectrum of direct and indirect demand-reducing
measures discussed above will be activated when
prices increase, and this will in turn mitigate the price
increase. This is what is behind the demand curves
shown in Figure 5.2 and what is formally modelled in
Sinn (2007a and b). However, it will be difficult to find
perfect substitutes for carbon fuel that would limit the
possible price increase sufficiently to make extraction
unprofitable. For example, it is hard to imagine that
air craft could ever be run on electricity from batter-
ies or on non-carbon fuels such as hydrogen and still
carry significant amounts of cargo, as the storage
devices for such energy are huge and heavy. If a
replacement fuel is used for aircraft, it will probably
be bio fuel, which is based on carbon, too. However,
the price of bio fuel will rise when more of it is
demanded, as the land available for its production is
very limited. According to the International Energy
Agency, an area of 1.4 gig hectares, which is equiva-
lent to all of the world’s current arable land, would be
necessary to completely satisfy the fuel requirements
from world transport (IEA 2006, p. 289), which is less
than one fifth of current fossil fuel consumption. The
actual amount of land available for the production of
bio fuel will be a tiny fraction of this area, as increas-
ing food prices will create vigorous resistance against
this type of energy production. The Tortilla Crisis of
Mexico City in January 2007 illustrates the kinds of
problems that will be encountered.7 Thus, it is very
unlikely that the possibility of substituting fossil fuel
with replacement energy will ever be able to impose a
price cap on fossil fuels. At higher prices, the demand
for fossil fuels will be less, but it will never become
zero. The last helicopter of the Chinese president will
not stop operating until the stock of fossil fuels has
been nearly exhausted. 
Admittedly there are other theoretical possibilities,
but they hinge on very special limiting assumptions
on the extraction cost and the price as time
approaches infinity which cannot, in principle, be
observed in this historical period of time. In what
follows we will therefore assume gradual exhaustion
as time goes to infinity, albeit at a speed that dwin-
dles towards zero. 
This does not mean that we presuppose the answer,
for in our opinion the true problem of global warm-
ing is not whether some of the stock of fossil fuels
underground will not be touched even after tens of
thousands of years, but how resource owners allocate
over time whatever they plan to extract over the next
few hundred years. 
In solving the intertemporal allocation problem, firms
implicitly face a perpetual portfolio optimisation
problem like an investment banker, choosing continu-
ously between storing their wealth in the stock in situ
and storing it in the form of financial assets. As fossil
fuels become scarcer as depletion proceeds, their mar-
ket price tends to increase over time, and sites of
unexploited stocks become more valuable, generating
capital gains for postponed extraction. On the other
hand, present extraction generates financial income
that can be invested in the capital markets where it
also generates a return. Like the investment banker,
clever resource-owning firms will allocate their wealth
between financial assets and the resource in situ so as
to maximise their total return. They will postpone
extraction if the capital gain from doing so exceeds
the interest that otherwise could have been earned in
the capital markets. And they will extract at present
and invest the proceeds in the capital markets if they
expect a capital gain from the resource in situ that is
lower than the interest on financial assets. 
As all resource-extracting firms follow a similar deci-
sion rule, the emerging extraction pattern must be
such that the resource in situ and financial assets gen-
erate roughly the same expected rate of return. If the
capital markets are more attractive, because current
resource prices are high and expected future prices are
low, most firms will decide to increase current extrac-
tion at the expense of future extraction. This will
reduce current prices and raise future prices, thereby
increasing the potential capital gains from postponing
7 The Tortilla Crisis, culminated in protests in Mexico City in
January 2007. The price of maize, half of which was imported from
the USA, more than doubled in the course of a year, primarily
because of the increase in maize used for the production of bio
ethanol. Mexico tried to solve the problem by imposing a state-
administered price ceiling for tortillas made of maize, combined with
duty-free imports of maize.extraction. Conversely, if the expected capital gains
exceed the return offered by the capital markets, firms
will decide to postpone extraction such that current
prices will rise and future ones will fall, reducing the
capital gains. In equilibrium, when firms are indiffer-
ent between postponing extraction and investing in
the capital market, the extraction path is chosen such
that the capital gain just matches the return on finan-
cial assets. 
In the simplest theoretical case where there are no
extraction costs, this implies that the price of the
resource in situ rises at a rate given by the market rate
of interest. This implication is called Hotelling’s rule
according to Hotelling’s (1931) seminal work on the
behaviour of resource extractors. 
Hotelling’s rule is a piece of positive economics,
describing how markets work. Interestingly enough,
however, his market rule is equivalent to an intertem-
poral efficiency rule developed by Solow (1974) and
Stiglitz (1974), disregarding the externalities from
global warming, which was not seen as a problem at
the time. Solow and Stiglitz saw the portfolio problem
from the viewpoint of mankind rather than individual
firms. Mankind has two alternatives for transferring
wealth and hence consumption to future generations:
it can bequeath the resources in situ or it can extract
the resources now and use them for additional pro-
duction of investment goods, such that a larger stock
of man-made capital generating more GDP can be
transferred to the future. Bequeathing an additional
unit of man-made capital has the advantage of gener-
ating a real return equal to the marginal product of
capital in production. Bequeathing an additional unit
of the resource in situ may have the advantage that the
extracted resource is able to make a greater contribu-
tion to the production of goods in the future than in
the present, as a dwindling resource stock and hence a
dwindling extraction flow makes the resource scarcer
over time and increases the marginal product of the
resource as an input to industrial production. In a
social optimum, the growth rate of the marginal prod-
uct of the extracted resource equals the marginal
product of capital. If this condition, the so-called
Solow-Stiglitz efficiency condition, is satisfied, an
intertemporal Pareto optimum prevails, which means
that it is impossible to find another extraction path
that would provide future generations with a higher
living standard without reducing the living standard
of the current generation. The efficiency condition is
the normative equivalent to the positive Hotelling’s
rule, as in a market equilibrium the marginal product
of the extracted resource equals its price and the mar-
ginal product of man-made capital equals the market
rate of interest. 
Both Hotelling’s rule and the Solow-Stiglitz efficiency
condition can be generalised to the more realistic case
of extraction costs. As the stocks of fossil fuels in situ
are not all equally accessible, their extraction involves
different unit extraction and exploration costs. Firms
normally extract the stocks with lower unit costs first
and then gradually proceed to those with higher unit
costs as the resource becomes scarcer and buyers are
willing to pay higher prices. Thus, unit extraction
costs are stock-dependent, the unit cost being the
higher, the smaller the remaining stock in situ. 
With stock-dependent extraction costs, the intertem-
poral market equilibrium, as discussed above, is
modified insofar as the rule that the capital gain
from postponing extraction be equal to the interest
on a financial investment now translates into an
equality between the rate of interest and the price
increase of the resource relative to the price net of
the unit extraction cost. Similarly, without consider-
ing the damage from global warming, the condition
for intertemporal Pareto optimality has to be modi-
fied. It now requires that the marginal product of
capital be equal to the increase of the marginal prod-
uct of the extracted resource relative to the marginal
product net of unit extraction costs. However, the
modified Hotelling’s rule still coincides with the
modified Solow-Stiglitz condition, implying that, in
principle, markets ensure an efficient intertemporal
extraction path. 
6. Sources of market failure
In reality, resource markets do not work as efficiently
as the above discussion suggests, because there are
various sources of market failure, the most important
ones arguably being insecure property rights and
global warming.
Insecure property rights constitute a severe problem
for resource owners given that substantial fractions of
fossil fuels are located in countries with unstable polit-
ical conditions. This is only a limited problem for
coal, huge sites of which are located in China and the
US. Methane and, in particular, crude oil, however,
are heavily affected by this problem. Figure 5.3 illus-
trates the problem for the case of crude oil reserves as
quoted in 2007. 
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75 percent of the world oil reserves are located in
Venezuela, Kazakhstan, Russia, the Middle East,
Libya and Nigeria, regions with unstable political
conditions and unstable property rights. It is not José
Manuel Barroso or Angela Merkel but people like
Hugo Chavez, Vladimir Putin and his oligarchs,
Mahmud Ahmadinejad or Muammar al-Gaddafi
who determine how quickly the oil is extracted and
how quickly the world is warming up. And unfortu-
nately, there is every reason to fear that it will be
warming up too quickly.
Insecure property rights in oil fields imply that
resource owners have little interest in leaving the oil
underground, because they feel uncertain about
whether their descendants or their clans will be able to
enjoy them in the future. Perhaps a revolution will
take place that brings a rivalling faction to power.
Perhaps democracy will be introduced, sweeping away
the previous ruling class of the country. Given these
uncertainties, it is better to extract the oil as quickly as
possible and invest the proceeds in Swiss bank
accounts. 
From a more formal perspective, insecure property
rights imply that a capital gain that matches the mar-
ket rate of interest is not enough to make resource
owners indifferent between extraction and conserva-
tion. Instead, the extraction path must begin with a
higher current rate of extraction which over time
shrinks faster so that the capital gain on the resource
in situ will rise sufficiently to compensate for the
expropriation risk. This diminishes the hope that mar-
ket forces will be able to generate the Pareto optimal
extraction path. 
This is even more true as the
Pareto optimal extraction path
itself may require more resource
conservation than is implied by
the modified Solow-Stiglitz effi-
ciency condition. The reason is
that the extracted carbon (or
rather 25–45 percent of it, as
argued above) is accumulated in
the atmosphere in the form of
CO2, creating ongoing damages
whose repair absorbs a certain
fraction of GDP. The possibility
of avoiding some of these dam-
ages by postponing extraction
makes postponing more attrac-
tive from a social perspective.
Postponing not only means that
the resource is able to make a
higher marginal contribution to GDP in the future
because it will be scarcer then. It also means that a
higher consumption level will be possible because a
lower fraction of GDP is needed to repair and accom-
modate the damages global warming will cause. Thus
future generations’ consumption of produced goods
can be increased without reducing the present genera-
tions’ consumption of such goods when more of the
resource stays underground and less man-made capi-
tal is produced.8
The two externalities both tend to widen the gap
between efficient and actual extraction of fossil fuels.
Insecure property rights mean that markets extract
the fossil fuels faster than they would in the case of
secure property rights, and Pareto efficiency in the
case of global warming implies that extraction should
proceed more slowly than even a perfect market with
secure property rights would achieve. In other words,
insecure property rights speed up global warming,
while extraction should in fact be slowed down rela-
tive to what would have been optimal without global
warming. 
7. The green policy paradox
Let us now return to the question of how demand
policies affect global warming. Stern et al. (2006)
emphasised the effect of price signals on the con-
sumers of fossil fuels. They implicitly seem to assume
that the time path of producer prices is fixed, such
Figure 5.3
8 See Sinn (2007a) for a formal proof of the condition for intertem-
poral Pareto optimality in the presence of global warming. that supply at each point in time is perfectly elastic
and demand alone determines the transactions vol-
ume. However, the truth is far from this assumption.
As nature’s supply of carbon fuels is given, the mar-
ket supply that resource owners generate from
nature’s supply may also be rather rigid and may
therefore ultimately determine the transactions vol-
ume in the fossil fuel markets and hence the pace of
global warming. Thus, how the demand-reducing
measures and the price signals they cause for the pro-
ducers affect the supply path of fossil fuels becomes
the crucial question. 
The reactions of the supply of fossil fuels have little in
common with the supply reactions of reproducible
commodities, as the intertemporal allocation problem
implies that a supply reduction in the present will lead
to a supply increase in the future and vice versa. To be
sure, an exogenous demand reduction in the present
that depresses the price today will give producers the
incentive to produce less; but producing less today
simply means postponing extraction. In the future,
when prices are back to their normal path, supply will
even be higher than otherwise would have been the
case. Conversely, exogenous demand reductions in the
future that depress future prices will imply less extrac-
tion in the future but more in the present. Whether
global warming slows down after the introduction of
demand-reducing policy measures therefore depends
on the whole time path of such measures from now
into the future expected by the suppliers. If the
expected exogenous demand reductions are balanced
over time, the extraction path may not react at all, so
that no environmental benefits are achieved. 
Long and Sinn (1985) gave these thoughts a more pre-
cise meaning. They showed for a very general class of
extraction cost functions that the supply reactions
depend on how the fall in demand induced by policy
measures would change the time path of the present
value of producer prices, given the old supply path as
would have prevailed without government interven-
tion. Call the difference between the old and the new
price at a particular point in time the “absolute price
wedge” and call the ratio of the absolute price wedge
and the old price the “relative price wedge”. If the
present value of the absolute price wedge induced by
policy measures declines over time, the supply path
will become flatter because firms will prefer to post-
pone extraction. If the present value of the absolute
price wedge rises, the reverse is true; and if the present
value of the absolute price wedge is the same for all
points in time, supply will be time invariant. 
To translate that into a specific policy measure,
assume all governments of the consuming countries
levy a time-invariant ad-valorem tax on the consump-
tion of fossil fuels. With the given old supply path this
tax would depress the producer price at all points in
time by a given percentage of the respective old price,
which means that the relative price wedge is constant.
Now assume for a moment that extraction costs are
negligible implying that, according to Hotelling’s rule,
the consumer price rises at a rate given by the rate of
discount. The absolute price wedge will then also rise
at this rate and hence be constant in present value
terms, as required for the neutrality result cited. Thus,
a constant ad valorem tax on fossil fuel consumption
will indeed leave the time path of extraction
unchanged if there are no extraction costs. 
However, governments cannot easily commit to levy-
ing a tax at a constant rate. What if resource owners
expect the rate to be increased over time, say due to an
increasing awareness of the CO2 problem by the pub-
lic? As shown in Sinn (1982) and Long and Sinn
(1985), in this case they will advance their sales to
avoid the increasing future tax burden. Global warm-
ing will accordingly accelerate, a phenomenon that
Sinn (2007b) has called the green paradox. The green
policy paradox gives a deeper meaning to the initial
remark that the supply reactions of firms that sell
exhaustible natural resources follow another logic
than those of normal firms, showing that the price
signals that taxes yield do not depend on the level of
taxes but on their change over time. 
This contrasts sharply with the views expressed by
Stern et al. (2006) as well as Newberry (2005), who
argue that the carbon consuming countries should
introduce carbon taxes to create a common worldwide
price signal for the consumers of fossil fuels inducing
them to curtail their demands. It is true, of course,
that a carbon tax that, at each point in time, reflects
the present value of the stream of marginal social
damages from a unit of carbon extracted at that point
in time would, in principle, be able to induce an effi-
cient extraction path. However, such a tax would not
in general be constant over time but would have to fol-
low a particular time path that cannot easily be calcu-
lated and would involve the risk of major policy mis-
takes, as the above discussion has shown. When ex-
traction costs are negligible and the tax is constructed
on an ad-valorem base, the tax would be neutral if its
rate stayed constant over time, and it would even exac-
erbate the problem of global warming if the tax rate
increased over time. 
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The green policy paradox can be generalised to the
more realistic case with extraction costs as well as to
other demand-reducing policy measures such as sub-
sidising bio fuel, wind mills and photovoltaic devices
and investing in research and development to find a
technical break-through in nuclear fusion. Let τ(t) be
the expected relative price wedge produced by a
demand reducing policy or, to be more precise, the
expected relative decline of the producer price of car-
bon at time t that would be induced by that policy if
the entire supply path from now to the distant future
remained unchanged. As shown in Sinn (2007b), the
neutrality condition for the supply path that ensures
that this path will indeed remain unchanged is 
, (borderline case for neutral demand
reducing policies) 
where τ ^ is the growth rate of the relative wedge τ; r is
the rate of discount; g(S) is the unit extraction and
exploration cost, which depends on the stock of
resource in situ, S; and P is the price of the resource
at a particular point in time before the policy-induced
demand reduction. If τ rises faster than given by this
equation, firms have an incentive to advance sales.
The extraction path becomes steeper with more
extraction in the present and near future and less
extraction in the more distant future. Conversely, if τ
rises more slowly, which could mean that it stays con-
stant or declines, the supply path becomes flatter and
global warming will slow down, as is intended. 
The equation shows that in the absence of extraction
costs (g = 0), the demand reducing policy is neutral if
τ ^ is zero, that is if the relative price wedge τ is a con-
stant. If the demand- reducing policy is brought
about by an ad valorem tax on resource consumption,
τ can be interpreted as the tax rate, and as such the
equation confirms the result cited above. However, as
explained, τ has a more general meaning applying to
all demand-reducing measures that would dampen the
producer prices of fossil carbon fuels with a given
supply path. 
When extraction costs are taken into account, the cri-
terion for neutrality is a moderate rise in the relative
price wedge in line with the terms on the right-hand
side of the equation. The neutral rate of increase in
the relative price wedge caused by demand-reducing
policies is a fraction of the discount rate given by the
share of the price needed to cover the extraction cost.
It follows that a demand-reducing policy that would
dampen the price path proportionately at all points in
time, if the extraction path remained unchanged, will
result in a flatter extraction path and will therefore
slow down global warming. This is indeed the reac-
tion expected by the green policy-makers.
However, the problem is that the green policy makers
must be able to credibly commit themselves to no
tightening of the demand-reducing policies in the
future. This condition is not typically met in reality.
To the contrary, green policy programs are often
defined such that the respective measures are gradual-
ly phased in, gaining strength over time. This may
then give rise to the green policy paradox even if
extraction costs are not negligible. 
There are many examples. As explained above, the
Kyoto Protocol of 1997 defined the target to reduce
CO2 output by 8 percent over the period from 1990 to
2010. In 2007, the EU Council decided to reduce EU
emissions of greenhouse gases by as much as 20 per-
cent relative to the 1990 level. The Council promised
to stick to that decision irrespective of what other
countries would do and it offered an even larger
decrease of 30 percent provided that other developed
countries committed themselves to similar emission
reductions. The tools to reach these goals include an
increase in energy efficiency, an increase in the share
of renewable energy sources and an increased use of
bio fuels (the additional emissions from deforestation
not being counted). Moreover, the EU is planning to
limit CΟ2 emissions of newly licensed cars to 120g per
km by 2012 (a policy criticised as hidden protection-
ism for the small cars produced in France and Italy)
and the inclusion of air traffic in the emissions trad-
ing system by 2011 for flights within the EU and by
2012 for all international flights to and from EU
countries. All of this means that the demand-reducing
policies will become stronger over time. 
Even if the strengthening of demand-reducing poli-
cies is not formally announced, a growing intensity of
green arguments in the media makes it very likely that
additional policies to reduce fossil fuel demand will be
put in place in the future. An important goal of all
environmentalists is to bring the US, China and India
on board. If that goal is achieved, major price cuts in
world carbon and oil markets, relative to what the
price otherwise would be, will result. All of this is like-
ly to make resource owners expect a sharply increas-
ing price wedge. If this wedge increases faster than the
cost share times the discount rate, they will tilt their
extraction path towards the present and global warm-






 =The green paradox is possible
with all the demand-reducing
measures cited in Section 2 to the
extent they do not follow endoge-
nously from the foreseeable price
increases but from exogenous
policy measures that change the
resource owners’ expectations of
future market conditions. Sub-
sidies to alternative fuels, de-
mand-reducing constraints on
car manufacturers and public
programmes for the development
of new energy sources are all bad
news for the resource owners,
inducing them to speed up their
extraction. Unfortunately, even
the EU emissions trading system
may have this implication, as its standards are to be
tightened over time. While 1734 million tonnes of
CO2 allowances were allocated to the first trading
period from 2005 to 2007, aggregate allowances were
reduced to 1623 million tonnes in the second period
running from 2008 to 2012,9 and it can be expected
that further cuts will be enacted upon the prolonga-
tion of this system. 
Figure 5.4 helps to determine the effect of emissions
trading on the pace of global warming. As in
Figure 5.2, there are (green) European countries and
others, each endowed with their specific carbon
demand curves. The graph refers to any given year
and demonstrates the implication of the trading sys-
tem relative to a situation where such a trading system
is absent. For other years, there will be similar graphs
with other positions of the curves and other widths
between the vertical axes, as the extraction volumes
change over time. Suppose for a moment, to be able to
apply the theorem cited above, that the time path of
the flow of worldwide carbon supply remained
unchanged by the policy measures such that the dia-
gram has the same width in each year as it would
without the policy change. Suppose further the
European countries impose a quantity constraint on
their CO2 emissions which they implement by way of
the certificate trading system. The reduced European
demand for fossil fuels will then depress the world
market price as shown in the figure with the move
from P* to P**. The European price, which fossil fuel
consumers have to pay, will be P** plus the price of
certificates, indicated by the curly bracket. The
absolute price wedge is τ P*, and the relative price
wedge is τ. 
For each year, a graph like Figure 5.4 defines a spe-
cific relative price wedge. Due to the tightening of
emissions standards in a growing world economy,
the relative price wedge is likely to be higher in the
future than in the present. It follows from the result
cited above that when the rate of growth of this
price wedge is greater than the cost share times the
rate of discount, the extraction path will, in fact, not
remain given but will become steeper, giving rise to
the green policy paradox. There will be more extrac-
tion in the present and the near future, and less
extraction in the more distant future relative to what
would have prevailed without the emissions trading
system. Thus, the graph shown in Figure 5.4 would
become wider in the present and near future and
narrower in the more distant future. Global warm-
ing accelerates. Good intentions do not always
breed good deeds. 
8. Useful policy measures
What are the policy measures that avoid the risk of
adverse supply reactions discussed in the previous sec-
tions and do work? How can global warming really be
mitigated? We distinguish here 
• fiscal measures that flatten the supply path
• measures to protect property rights
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A fiscal measure to flatten the supply path would be
the introduction of an ad valorem tax on the con-
sumption of fossil fuels that shrinks over time. While
this would be a straightforward and safe policy from
an economic perspective, it is hard to imagine it in
practice, as no government could convincingly com-
mit to it. As the world becomes warmer, the voices
calling for action will become stronger and stronger. It
strikes us as impossible from a public choice perspec-
tive that a gradually declining tax on fossil fuels could
ever be introduced. 
Alternatively, one could try to internalise the positive
externality resulting from not extracting the fossil fuel
resources by subsidising the stock underground, so
that resource owners would find it more rewarding to
postpone extraction. Again this is only a theoretical
possibility without a chance to be implemented.
Given that, in the opinion of the consuming coun-
tries, the resource-owning countries are already charg-
ing excessive prices, the public will never agree to sub-
sidise the resource owners in addition. 
A somewhat more promising solution is the introduc-
tion of a unit tax on fossil fuel consumption. If the
tax remains constant over time, its present value
declines, and hence, as shown in Sinn (1982), markets
will postpone extraction. In fact, such a tax could
even be efficient under special theoretical circum-
stances. Suppose that a marginal unit of carbon
extracted creates a constant marginal damage, b, in all
future years from the time of extraction to infinity,
and suppose further that the rate of interest, i, is time
invariant. In that case, the present value of the stream
of marginal damages would be equal to b/i at all
points in time regardless of when the extraction takes
place. A constant absolute tax wedge of b/i would
therefore be able to correctly compensate for the dis-
tortion resulting from global warming. However,
under realistic conditions, b will be far from being a
time-invariant constant such that no simple tax rule
will be available. Moreover, even a unit tax could pro-
duce the green paradox if its rate were to increase suf-
ficiently fast due to the increasing awareness of the
public about the problem of global warming. 
Another option is to make alternative investment less
attractive for the resource owners, who extract fast in
order to invest their proceeds in financial assets. If,
say, the Western world made an active attempt to
close the tax heavens of this world and imposed
source taxes on the capital income earned by resource
owners, the resource owners would face a permanent
incentive to postpone extraction and keep larger
stocks of the resource in the ground. The measure
would reduce the discount rate of resource owners
and would be a powerful policy instrument to flatten
the supply path and mitigate global warming.
A similar implication could be expected if the
Western world threatened the resource owners with
the expropriation of their financial savings. This
threat would also reduce the discount rate of resource
owners and counteract the threat of expropriating
their resources in situ which in itself tends to acceler-
ate extraction and global warming. However, it
would be very difficult and dangerous to implement
such a policy if only because it would also undermine
the credibility of the financial system as such and
scare off normal savers. But increased legal efforts to
sequester the financial assets of current or past dicta-
tors (and their entourage) in oil-producing countries
charged with various criminal offences could serve
the same purpose. 
An alternative possibility to make resource conserva-
tion more attractive for the resource owners would be
a strengthening of their property rights in the
resources themselves. If the dictators of the oil
exporting countries were less afraid of being replaced
by their rivals or, for that matter, by a Western style
democracy, there would be less reason for them to
rush to convert their resources into financial assets.
However, again, both from a practical point of view
and from the perspective of humanitarian values,
these conclusions are disquieting, to say the least. It is
beyond our expertise to come up with policy conclu-
sions regarding war and peace. 
Despite the disappointing results of our analysis con-
cerning demand policies, the policy of imposing
quantity constraints via an emissions trading system
could be given another try. It would be essential
though to make the system tight without any excep-
tions to avoid the countervailing demand increases
resulting from the relative decline in world energy
prices. A truly strict monopsony of the consuming
countries would be able to dictate its quantity con-
straints on supply and force the resource owners to
adjust their extraction quantities to whatever demand
the monopsony chose. 
Mind, however, that this would basically be a central
planning solution with all the errors and inefficiencies
history has shown. Its success would depend on politi-
cians having the proper knowledge to implement theright extraction paths and being benevolent agents
who act on behalf of mankind’s future. We are scepti-
cal whether such a solution would feasible, but we are
afraid that mankind may ultimately be forced to
choose it. We agree with the Stern Review that con-
vincingly argued that the problem of global warming
is the world’s largest externality ever. The choice will
undoubtedly be one between various evils. 
What remains as policy options goes beyond the
attempt to modify supply and demand for fossil fuels
but seeks the solution in storing the CO2 generated by
combustion processes away from the atmosphere.
There are two promising alternatives. The first is
sequestration. In addition to the pipeline and trans-
portation network linking the fuel sites with the places
of combustion, there could be a second one to trans-
port the CO2 back to the “mines”from where the car-
bon came and store it there in liquid form under
extremely high pressure. The space emptied under-
ground could be refilled with the remainders of the
combustion process. Unfortunately, this would not
only be very expensive but one could doubt whether it
is technically feasible, because much more storage
space would be needed than that emptied by extrac-
tion. For example, upon combustion one cubic meter
of anthracite generates 5.4 cubic meters of liquid
CO2, and one cubic meter of crude oil generates
3.6 cubic meters of liquid CO2 (55 bar at 20 C).
Hence, additional space would have to be sought. But
even if the search were successful, the safety problems
involved would be large. After all, CO2 is heavier than
oxygen so that any leakage from below ground could
have fatal risks for the population living above. A sim-
ilar remark is appropriate with regard to attempts to
pump the CO2 into the sea. The risks for maritime life
and the nutrition cycle could be larger than the advan-
tages from slowing down global warming.
A much safer storage device is trees. Not too long ago,
a much larger area of the world’s surface than today
was covered by trees. Trees store the reduced carbon
that photosynthesis filters out of the atmosphere. It is
estimated that each year deforestation contributes
18 percent to the increase in the CO2 content of the
atmosphere, more than all the traffic of the world.10 If
deforestation could be stopped and true afforestation
in net terms, which leads to an expansion of the
world’s forests, could be brought about, a substantial
contribution to solving the problem of global warm-
ing would be made. 
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